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Abstract. In CRYPTO 2015, Elias, Lauter, Ozman and Stange de-
scribed an attack on the non-dual decision version of the ring learning
with errors problem (RLWE) for two special families of defining polyno-
mials, whose construction depends on the modulus q that is being used.
For particularly chosen error parameters, they managed to solve non-
dual decision RLWE given 20 samples, with a success rate ranging from
10% to 80%. In this paper we show how to solve the search version for
the same families and error parameters, using only 7 samples with a
success rate of 100%. Moreover our attack works for every modulus q′
instead of the q that was used to construct the defining polynomial. The
attack is based on the observation that the RLWE error distribution
for these families of polynomials is very skewed in the directions of the
polynomial basis. For the parameters chosen by Elias et al. the smallest
errors are negligible and simple linear algebra suffices to recover the se-
cret. But enlarging the error paremeters makes the largest errors wrap
around, thereby turning the RLWE problem unsuitable for cryptographic
applications. These observations also apply to dual RLWE, but do not
contradict the seminal work by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev.
1 Introduction
Hard problems on lattices have become popular building blocks for cryptographic
primitives mainly because of two reasons: firstly, lattice based cryptography ap-
pears to remain secure even in the presence of quantum computers, and secondly,
the security of the primitives can be based on worst-case hardness assumptions.
Although it seems appealing to use classical hard lattice problems such as the
shortest vector problem or closest vector problem for cryptographic applications,
the learning with errors problem (LWE) has proven much more versatile. This
problem was introduced by Regev [12, 13] who showed that an efficient algorithm
for LWE results in efficient quantum algorithms for approximate lattice prob-
lems. The decision version of LWE can be defined informally as the problem of
distinguishing noisy linear equations from truly random ones. More precisely, let
n ≥ 1 be an integer dimension and q ≥ 2 an integer modulus, then the prob-
lem is to distinguish polynomially many pairs of the form (ai, bi ≈ 〈ai, s〉) from
uniformly random and independent pairs. The vectors ai are chosen uniformly
random in Znq , the vector s is secret and the same for all pairs, and the element
bi is computed as bi = 〈ai, s〉 + ei where ei is a random error term drawn from
an error distribution on Zq, such as a discretized Gaussian. The search version
of LWE asks to recover the secret vector s. The hardness of the LWE problem
has been analyzed in [12, 13, 11, 8, 3].
The main downside of LWE is that it is not very practical, basically due to
the fact that each new ai only gives rise to one element bi (and not a vector
of n elements as one could hope). The result is that the public key size and
the computation time of LWE-based cryptosystems are typically quadratic in
the security parameter. Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev [9] solved this issue
by introducing the Ring-LWE (RLWE) problem and showing its hardness under
wost-case assumptions on ideal lattices. Its flavour is distantly similar to that
of NTRU [7]. Informally, the secret key space Znq is replaced by Rq = R/qR
where R is the ring of integers in a number field K = Q[x]/(f) with f a monic
irreducible integral polynomial of degree n and q ≥ 2 an integer modulus. The
inner product on Znq is replaced by the ring product in Rq. In its non-dual form
the decision version of RLWE is then roughly defined as follows: distinguish
polynomially many samples of the form (ai,bi ≈ ai · s) from uniformly random
and independent pairs. Here the ai ∈ Rq are uniformly random and independent,
s ∈ Rq is a fixed random secret, and bi is computed as bi = ai ·s+ei where ei ∈
Rq is a short random error term that is drawn from a specific error distribution
ψ on Rq. The search version of the problem is to recover the secret s from the
list of samples. We stress that the actual problem described and analyzed in [9]
is the dual RLWE problem, in which the secret and the error term are taken
from the reduction modulo q of a certain fractional ideal of K, denoted by R∨q ;
see Section 2 for more details.
As explained in [9, 5], the search and decision problems are equivalent when
K is Galois and q is a prime number that splits into prime ideals with small
norm (polynomial in n). In general, no such reduction is known and it is easy to
see that search RLWE is at least as hard as decision RLWE.
The definition of the error distribution ψ on Rq (or on R
∨
q ) plays a cru-
cial role in RLWE and is obtained by pulling back a near-spherical Gaussian
distribution under the canonical embedding of the number field. An alternative
problem [5] is called Polynomial-LWE (PLWE) and uses an error distribution on
Rq where each coordinate of the error term with respect to the polynomial basis
1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1 is drawn independently from a fixed one-dimensional Gaussian
distribution. Again we refer to Section 2 for more details.
In [5], Eisentraeger, Hallgren and Lauter presented families of defining poly-
nomials f ∈ Z[x] and moduli q such that the decision version of PLWE is weak.
The attack can be described in a nutshell as follows: assume that f(1) ≡ 0 mod q,
then evaluation at 1 defines a ring homomorphism φ from Rq to Zq. Applying φ
to the PLWE samples results in equations of the form ai(1) ·s(1)+ei(1) = bi(1).
Therefore, if the images ei(1) of the error terms can be distinguished from uni-
form, one can simply loop through all possibilities for s(1) ∈ Zq and determine
if the corresponding ei(1) are uniform on Zq or not. So as long as q is small
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enough (such that one can exhaustively run through Zq), f(1) ≡ 0 mod q, and
the images ei(1) do not wrap around too much modulo q, this attack breaks
decision PLWE.
In [6], Elias, Lauter, Ozman and Stange extended this attack to the decision
version of non-dual RLWE, rather than PLWE, by showing that for defining
polynomials of the form
fn,a,b = x
n + ax+ b ∈ Z[x]
where n, a, b are specifically chosen parameters such that i.a. fn,a,b(1) ≡ 0 mod q,
the distortion introduced by pulling back the Gaussian error terms through
the canonical embedding is small enough such that the attack on PLWE still
applies. This attack was executed for three parameter sets n, a, b, r where given
20 samples, non-dual decision RLWE could be solved with success rates ranging
from 10% to 80% depending on the particular family considered [6, Section 9].
Here the parameter r determines the width of the Gaussian that is being pulled
back, which Elias et al. chose to be spherical.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows. Firstly, we explain how to
solve the search version of non-dual RLWE, which one might expect to be a
harder problem than the decision version (due to the fact that the correspond-
ing number fields are not Galois), for the same parameter sets, using only 7
samples with a success rate of 100%. The attack invokes simple linear algebra to
recover the secret element s and does not use that fn,a,b(1) ≡ 0 mod q: in fact,
for the same defining polynomial and the same error parameter r our attack
works for every modulus q′. Secondly, we show that if one tries to adjust r in
order to obtain a hard instance of non-dual RLWE, the first few components
of the noise wrap around modulo q and become indistinguishable from uniform,
thereby obstructing certain cryptographic applications. Thirdly, we show that
our observations also apply to the dual RLWE problem when set up for the same
number fields: either the errors wrap around or linear algebra can be used to
reveal the secret. The latter situation only occurs for error widths that are way
too small for the hardness results of Lyubashekvsy, Peikert and Regev [9] to be
applicable. Therefore neither the results from [6] nor our present attack seem to
form a threat on RLWE, at least when set up along the guidelines in [9, 10].
Our observations are easiest to explain for a = 0, a case which covers two of
the three parameter sets. From fn,a,b(1) = b+1 ≡ 0 mod q and fn,a,b(1) 6= 0 (by
irreducibility) it follows that the roots of fn,a,b lie on a circle with radius
ρ ≥ n
√
q − 1 > 1.
With respect to the polynomial basis 1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1, the canonical embedding
matrix is essentially the Vandermonde matrix generated by these roots, whose
column norms grow geometrically as
√
n,
√
nρ, . . . ,
√
nρn−1.
This simple observation has major implications for the distortion introduced by
the inverse of the canonical embedding: the distribution of the error terms will
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be extremely stretched at the terms of low degree, whereas they will be squashed
at the terms of high degree. For the parameter sets attacked by Elias et al., the
latter are so small that after rounding they simply become zero, thereby resulting
in exact linear equations in the coefficients of the secret element s. Given enough
samples (in the cases considered, between 4 and 7 samples suffice), the secret s
can be recovered using elementary linear algebra. Furthermore, since the ratio
between the maximal and the minimal distortion is roughly ρn ≥ q − 1, it is
impossible to increase the width of the Gaussians used without causing the
errors at the terms of low degree to wrap around modulo q.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we recall
the definition of PLWE and of dual and non-dual RLWE, with particular focus
on the error distributions involved. Section 3 reviews the attacks on decision
PLWE by Eisentraeger, Hallgren and Lauter and non-dual decision RLWE by
Elias, Lauter, Ozman and Stange. Section 4 describes our attack on non-dual
search RLWE by analyzing the singular value decomposition of the canonical
embedding. We also report on an implementation of our attack in Magma [2],
which shows that we can indeed easily break the families considered in [6] using
less samples, with a higher success probability, and for every choice of modulus
q′ (instead of just the q that was used to define fn,a,b). We also discuss how
switching to dual RLWE affects these observations. In Section 5 we study the
effect of increasing the error parameter as an attempt to counter our attack, and
compare with the hardness results from [9]. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we briefly recall the necessary background on number fields, the
canonical embedding and Gaussian distributions to give proper definitions of
PLWE and dual and non-dual RLWE.
2.1 Number fields and the canonical embedding
Let f ∈ Z[x] be a monic irreducible polynomial of degree n and consider the
number field K = Q[x]/(f) it defines. Let R ⊂ K denote the ring of integers
of K, i.e. the set of all algebraic integers that are contained in K. If f can be
taken such that R = Z[x]/(f), then K is called a monogenic number field and f
a monogenic polynomial.
The field K has exactly n embeddings into C denoted by σi : K → C for
i = 1, . . . , n. These n embeddings correspond precisely to evaluation in each of
the n distinct roots αi of f , i.e. an element a(x) ∈ K is mapped to σi(a(x)) =
a(αi) ∈ C. Assume that f has s1 real roots and n− s1 = 2s2 complex conjugate
roots and order the roots such that αs1+k = αs1+s2+k for k = 1, . . . , s2. The
canonical embedding (also known as the Minkowski embedding) σ : K → Cn is
then defined as:
σ(a) = (σ1(a), . . . , σs1(a), σs1+1(a), . . . , σs1+s2(a), σs1+1(a), . . . , σs1+s2(a)) .
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It is easy to see that the canonical embedding maps into the spaceH ⊂ Rs1×C2s2
given by
H = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rs1 × C2s2 : xs1+j = xs1+s2+j ,∀j ∈ [1 . . . s2]} .
The space H is isomorphic to Rn as an inner product space by considering the
orthonormal basis for H given by the columns of
B =
Is1×s1 0 00 1√2Is2×s2 i√2Is2×s2
0 1√
2
Is2×s2 − i√2Is2×s2
 .
With respect to this basis, the coordinates of σ(a) are given by a real vector
(a˜1, . . . , a˜n) := (σ1(a), . . . , σs1(a),
√
2Re(σs1+1(a)), . . . ,
√
2Re(σs1+s2(a)),√
2 Im(σs1+1(a)), . . . ,
√
2 Im(σs1+s2(a))).
Note that in [6] the authors did not include the factor
√
2, but we choose to keep
it since it makes B unitary.
In summary, an element a(x) ∈ K can be represented in the polynomial basis
as (a0, . . . , an−1) where a(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 aix
i but also by a real vector (a˜1, . . . , a˜n)
where the canonical embedding of a is given by:
σ(a) = B · (a˜1, . . . , a˜n)t .
Let Mf denote the Vandermonde matrix (α
j−1
i )i,j for i, j = 1, . . . , n, then the
polynomial basis representation is related to the (real) canonical embedding
representation by the following transformation
(a0, . . . , an−1)t = M−1f ·B · (a˜1, . . . , a˜n)t .
Since M−1f will play a crucial role in the following, we denote it with Nf . Later
on, to ease notation we will just write Mf instead of Mfn,a,b , and similarly for
Nf .
2.2 Ideals of the ring of integers and their dual
An integral ideal I ⊆ R is an additive subgroup of R closed under multiplication
by elements of R, i.e. rI ⊂ I for any r ∈ R. A fractional ideal I ⊂ K is a set
such that dI ⊆ R is an integral ideal for some d ∈ R. A principal (fractional
or integral) ideal I is one that is generated by some u ∈ K, i.e. I = uR; we
denote it as I = 〈u〉. The sum I + J of two (fractional or integral) ideals is the
set of all x+ y with x ∈ I, y ∈ J and the product I · J is the smallest (fractional
or integral) ideal containing all products x · y with x ∈ I, y ∈ J . The set of
non-zero fractional ideals forms a group under multiplication; this is not true
for integral ideals. The inverse of a non-zero fractional ideal is denoted by I−1.
Every fractional ideal I is a free Z-module of rank n, and therefore I ⊗Q = K.
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Its image σ(I) under the canonical embedding is a lattice of rank n inside the
space H.
The trace Tr = TrK/Q : K → Q maps an element x to the sum of its
embeddings Tr (x) =
∑n
i=1 σi(x) and defines an additive homomorphism from
R to Z. The norm No = NoK/Q : K → Q takes the product of all embeddings
No(x) =
∏n
i=1 σi(x) and is multiplicative.
For a fractional ideal I, its dual I∨ is defined as
I∨ = {x ∈ K : Tr(xI) ⊆ Z} .
It is easy to see that (I∨)∨ = I and that I∨ is also a fractional ideal. (Under
the canonical embedding, this corresponds to the usual notion of dual lattice,
modulo complex conjugation.) Furthermore, for any fractional ideal I, its dual
is I∨ = I−1R∨. The factor R∨ is a fractional ideal called the codifferent and its
inverse is called the different ideal which is integral. For a monogenic defining
polynomial f , i.e. R = Z[x]/(f) we have that R∨ = 〈1/f ′(α)〉 where α is a root
of f . Applying this fact to the cyclotomic number field of degree n = 2k with
defining polynomial f(x) = xn + 1, we get that f ′(ξ2n) = nξn−12n with ξ2n a
primitive 2n-th root of unity. Thus R∨ = 〈n−1〉, since ξn−12n is a unit.
2.3 Gaussian distributions and discretization
Denote by Γr the normal Gaussian distribution on R with mean 0 and parameter
r given by Γr(x) = r
−1 exp(−pix2/r2). Note that we have r = √2piρ with ρ the
standard deviation. We can define an elliptical Gaussian distribution Γr on H as
follows: let r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ (R+)n be a vector of n positive real numbers, then
a sample of Γr is given by B·(x1, . . . , xn)t where each xi is sampled independently
from Γri on R. Note that via the inverse of the canonical embedding this also
defines a distribution Ψr on K ⊗ R, in other words
Nf ·B · (x1, . . . , xn)t
gives us the coordinates of Γr ← (x1, . . . , xn) with respect to the polynomial
basis 1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1.
In practice we sample from the continuous distribution Γr modulo some finite
but sufficiently high precision (e.g. using the Box-Muller method). In particular
our samples live over Q rather than R, so that an element sampled from Ψr
can be truly seen as an element of the field K. For use in RLWE one even
wants to draw elements from I for some fixed fractional ideal I ⊂ K, where
I = R (non-dual RLWE) and I = R∨ (dual RLWE) are the main examples. In
this case one should discretize the Gaussian distribution Γr to the lattice σ(I).
There are several ways of doing this, e.g. by rounding coordinates with respect
to some given Z-module basis; see [10, 9] and the references therein. But for our
conclusions this discretization is not relevant, and because it would needlessly
complicate things we will just omit it.
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2.4 The Polynomial-LWE and Ring-LWE problem
In this section we provide formal definitions of PLWE [5] and RLWE [9, 4], both
in its dual and its non-dual version [6]. We stress that it is the dual version
of RLWE that was introduced in [9] and for which certain hardness results are
available, one of which is recalled in Theorem 1 below.
Let f ∈ Z[x] be a monic irreducible polynomial of degree n and let q ≥ 2
be an integer modulus. Consider the quotient ring P = Z[x]/(f) and denote
with Pq the residue ring P/qP . Denote with Γ
n
r the spherical Gaussian on Rn
with parameter r and interpret this as a distribution on P ⊗R by mapping the
standard basis of Rn to the polynomial basis 1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1 of P . In particular,
elements e(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 eix
i ← Γnr have each coefficient ei drawn independently
from Γr. Let U(Pq) denote the uniform distribution on Pq and let U(Pq,R) be the
uniform distribution on the torus Pq,R = (P ⊗ R)/qP .
With these ingredients we can define the decision and search PLWE problems.
Definition 1 (PLWE distribution). For s(x) ∈ Pq and r ∈ R+, a sample
from the PLWE distribution As(x),r over Pq × Pq,R is generated by choosing
a(x) ← U(Pq), choosing e(x) ← Γnr and outputting (a(x),b(x) = a(x) · s(x) +
e(x) mod qP ).
Definition 2 (Decision PLWE). The decision PLWE problem is to distin-
guish, for a random but fixed choice of s(x)← U(Pq), with non-negligible advan-
tage between arbitrarily many independent samples from As(x),r and the same
number of independent samples from U(Pq)× U(Pq,R).
Definition 3 (Search PLWE). For a random but fixed choice of s(x) ←
U(Pq), the search PLWE problem is to recover s(x) with non-negligible prob-
ability from arbitrarily many independent samples from As(x),r.
To define the dual and non-dual RLWE problems we require a degree n
number field K with ring of integers R. We also fix a fractional ideal I ⊂ K,
for which two choices are available: in the dual RLWE problems we let I = R∨,
while in the non-dual RLWE problems we take I = R. Note that I⊗R = K⊗R,
so we can view the distribution Ψr from the previous section as a distribution
on I ⊗ R. We let Iq denote I/qI and write Iq,R for the torus (I ⊗ R)/qI. As
before we let U(Iq) denote the uniform distribution on Iq and let U(Iq,R) be the
uniform distribution on Iq,R.
Definition 4 (RLWE distribution). For s(x) ∈ Iq and r ∈ (R+)n, a sample
from the RLWE distribution As(x),r over Rq × Iq,R is generated by choosing
a(x) ← U(Rq), choosing e(x) ← Ψr and returning (a(x),b(x) = a(x) · s(x) +
e(x) mod qI).
Definition 5 (Decision RLWE). The decision RLWE problem is to distin-
guish, for a random but fixed choice of s(x)← U(Iq), with non-negligible advan-
tage between arbitrarily many independent samples from As(x),r and the same
number of independent samples from U(Rq)× U(Iq,R).
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Definition 6 (Search RLWE). For a random but fixed choice of s(x)← U(Iq),
the search RLWE problem is to recover s(x) with non-negligible probability from
arbitrarily many independent samples from As(x),r.
A hardness statement on the search RLWE problem in its dual form (i.e. with
I = R∨) was provided by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev. For proof-technical
reasons their result actually deals with a slight variant called the search RLWE≤r
problem, where r ∈ R+. In this variant each sample is taken from As(x),r for a
new choice of r, chosen uniformly at random from {(r1, . . . , rn) ∈ (R+)n | ri ≤
r for all i}. Think of this parameter r and the modulus q ≥ 2 as quantities that
vary with n, and let ω be a superlinear function. Then Lyubashevsky et al.
proved:
Theorem 1 ([9, Theorem 4.1]). If r ≥ 2ω(√log n) then for some negligible
ε (depending on n) there is a probabilistic polynomial-time quantum reduction
from KDGSγ to RLWE≤r, where
γ : I 7→ max
{
ηε(I) · (
√
2q/r) · ω(
√
log n),
√
2n/λ1(I
∨)
}
.
Here ηε(I) is the smoothing parameter of σ(I) with threshold ε, and λ1(I
∨) is
the length of a shortest vector of σ(I∨).
In the above statement KDGSγ refers to the discrete Gaussian sampling problem,
which is about producing samples from a spherical Gaussian inH with parameter
r′, discretized to the lattice σ(I), for any given non-zero ideal I ⊂ R and any
r′ ≥ γ(I). As discussed in [9] there are easy reductions from certain standard
lattice problems to the discrete Gaussian sampling problem.
As an intermediate step in their proof Lyubashevsky et al. obtain a classical
(i.e. non-quantum) reduction from an instance of the bounded distance decoding
problem in ideal lattices to RLWE≤r; see [9, Lemma 4.5].
In contrast, Elias, Lauter, Ozman and Stange [6] study RLWE in its non-
dual version, and for the sake of comparison our main focus will also be on
that setting, i.e. we will mostly take I = R. In Section 4.3 we will look at the
effect of switching to the dual case where I = R∨, and in Section 5 we will
include the above hardness result in the discussion. Moreover, again as in [6],
the noise parameter r = (r1, . . . , rn) will usually be taken fixed and spherical,
i.e. r1 = · · · = rn = r.
3 Provably weak instances of non-dual decision RLWE
In [5], Eisentraeger, Hallgren and Lauter presented families of defining polyno-
mials f ∈ Z[x] such that the decision version of PLWE is weak. This attack
was later extended to non-dual decision RLWE [6] by Elias, Lauter, Ozman
and Stange. In this section we recall the attack, first for PLWE and then how
it transfers to non-dual RLWE. We provide a detailed analysis of the singular
value decomposition of the matrix Nf for these polynomial families, since this
will play an instructive role in our exposition.
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3.1 Attack on decision PLWE
The simplest form of the attack on decision PLWE requires that the defining
polynomial f of P and the modulus q satisfy the relation f(1) ≡ 0 mod q.
This implies that evaluation at 1 induces a ring homomorphism φ : Pq → Zq :
a(x) 7→ a(1) mod q. By applying φ to the PLWE samples (ai,bi = ai · s + ei)
we obtain tuples in Z2q namely (φ(ai), φ(ai) · φ(s) + φ(beie)). Here beie denotes
the polynomial obtained by rounding each coefficient of ei to the nearest integer
(with ties broken upward, say).
Assuming that the images of the error terms ei under the homomorphism φ
can be distinguished from uniform with sufficiently high probability, one obtains
the following straightforward attack: for each guess s ∈ Zq for the value of
φ(s) = s(1) mod q, compute the corresponding image of the (rounded) error term
φ(beie) as φ(bbie)−φ(ai)s, assuming that the guess is correct. If there exists an
s such that the corresponding images φ(beie) are more or less distributed like
a discretized Gaussian, rather than uniform, the samples were indeed likely to
be actual PLWE samples and the secret s satisfies s(1) = s. If no such guess is
found, the samples were likely to be uniform samples. The attack succeeds if the
following three conditions are met:
1. f(1) ≡ 0 mod q,
2. q is small enough that Zq can be enumerated,
3. φ(bΓnr e) is distinguishable from uniform U(Zq).
Note that if ei is sampled from Γ
n
r , then the ei(1) are also Gaussian distributed
but with parameter
√
n · r. Therefore, as long as √n · r is sufficiently smaller
than q, it should be possible to distinguish φ(bΓnr e) from uniform.
3.2 Attack on non-dual decision RLWE
The attack of Elias et al. on non-dual decision RLWE basically works by in-
terpreting the RLWE samples as PLWE samples and then executing the above
attack. For this approach to work, two requirements need to be fulfilled. Firstly,
the ring of integers R of the number field K should be a quotient ring of the
form R = Z[x]/(f), i.e. the number field should be monogenic.
The second condition deals with the difference between the error distribu-
tions of PLWE and non-dual RLWE. For PLWE one simply uses a spherical
Gaussian Γnr on R ⊗ R with respect to the polynomial basis 1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1,
whereas the RLWE distribution Ψr is obtained by pulling back a near-spherical
Gaussian distribution on H through the canonical embedding σ. With respect to
the polynomial basis one can view Ψr as a near-spherical Gaussion that got dis-
torted by Nf ·B. Since B is a unitary transformation, the only actual distortion
comes from Nf .
The maximum distortion of Nf is captured by its spectral norm s1(Nf ),
i.e. its largest singular value. The other singular values are denoted by si(Nf )
ordered by size such that sn(Nf ) denotes its smallest singular value. A spher-
ical Gaussian distribution on H of parameter r = (r, r, . . . , r) will therefore be
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transformed into an elliptical Gaussian distribution on R ⊗ R = K ⊗ R where
the maximum parameter will be given by s1(Nf ) · r. The attack on non-dual
decision RLWE then proceeds by considering the samples with errors coming
from Ψr as PLWE samples where the error is bounded by a spherical Gaussian
with deviation s1(Nf ) · r, with r = max(r).
For the attack to succeed we therefore need the following four conditions:
1. K is monogenic,
2. f(1) ≡ 0 mod q,
3. q is small enough that Zq can be enumerated,
4. r′ = s1(Nf ) · r is small enough such that φ(bΓnr′e) can be distinguished from
uniform.
Again note that if ei is bounded by Γ
n
r then the ei(1) are bounded by a
Gaussian with parameter
√
n ·r′ = √n ·s1(Nf ) ·r. So the requirement is that the
latter quantity is sufficiently smaller than q. In fact this is a very rough estimate,
and indeed Elias et al. empirically observe in [6, §9] that their attack works more
often than this bound predicts. We will explain this observation in Section 4.1.
In [6] the authors remark that given a parameter set (n, q, r) for PLWE, one
cannot simply use the same parameter set for non-dual RLWE since the canonical
embedding of the ring R into H might be very sparse, i.e. the covolume (volume
of a fundamental domain) of σ(R) in H might be very large. They therefore
propose to scale up the parameter r by a factor of |det(MfB)|1/n = |det(Mf )|1/n,
which is the n-th root of the covolume. Thus given a PLWE parameter set
(n, q, r), their corresponding RLWE parameter set reads (n, q, r˜) with r˜ = r ·
|det(Mf )|1/n.
3.3 Provably weak number fields for non-dual decision RLWE
The first type of polynomials to which the attack of [6] was applied are polyno-
mials of the form fn,a,b with a = 0. More precisely they considered
fn,q := fn,0,q−1 = xn + q − 1 ,
where n ≥ 1 and q is a prime. Note that the roots of these polynomials are simply
the primitive 2n-th roots of unity scaled up by (q − 1)1/n. These polynomials
satisfy fn,q(1) ≡ 0 mod q and are irreducible by Eisenstein’s criterion whenever
q − 1 has a prime factor with exponent one. As shown in [6, Proposition 3], the
polynomials fn,q are monogenic whenever q − 1 is squarefree, n is a power of a
prime `, and `2 - ((1−q)n−(1−q)). In particular it is easy to construct examples
for n = 2k.
The final missing ingredient is a bound on the spectral norm s1(Nf ). In [6],
a slightly different matrix Mf is used (it is a real matrix containing the real and
imaginary parts of the roots of f). For use further down, we adapt the proof of
[6, Proposition 4] to derive all singular values si(Nf ). Due to its practical impor-
tance we will only deal with the case where n is even, since we are particularly
interested in the case where n = 2k.
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Proposition 1 (Adapted from [6, Proposition 4]). Assume that fn,q is
irreducible and that n is even, then the singular values si(Nf ) are given by
si(Nf ) =
1√
n(q − 1)(i−1)/n .
Proof: The roots of fn,q are given by a · ξj2n for 0 < j < 2n and j odd, with
a = (q − 1)1/n ∈ R+ and ξ2n a primitive 2n-th root of unity. To derive the
singular values of Nf = M
−1
f it suffices to derive the singular values of Mf .
Recall that the u-th column of Mf (counting from 0) is given by
au · (ξu2n, ξ3u2n, . . . , ξ(2n−1)u2n )t .
The (Hermitian) inner product of the u-th and v-th column is therefore given
by
S = au+v ·
n−1∑
k=0
ξ
(2k+1)(u−v)
2n .
Since ξ2n+12n = ξ2n, we obtain that ξ
2(u−v)
2n S = S. For u 6= v we have that
ξ
2(u−v)
2n 6= 1, which implies that S = 0. For u = v we obtain S = na2u. This shows
that the matrix Mf has columns that are orthogonal. The singular values of Mf
can be read off from the diagonal of Mf
t ·Mf , in particular si(Mf ) =
√
nan−i
for i = 1, . . . , n. This also shows that si(Nf ) = 1/(
√
nai−1) for i = 1, . . . , n. One
finishes the proof by using that an = q − 1. 
The above proposition gives s1(Nf ) = 1/
√
n which is small enough for the
attack described in Section 3.2 to apply. In [6, Section 9], two examples of this
family were attacked, giving the following results:
fn,q q r r˜ samplesper run successfulruns
time
per run
x192 + 4092 4093 8.87 5440.28 20 1 of 10 25 sec
x256 + 8190 8191 8.35 8399.70 20 2 of 10 44 sec
Recall that r˜ is simply r scaled up by a factor |det(Mf )|1/n. We remark, as do
Elias et al. [6, §9], that these two examples unfortunately do not satisfy that
q − 1 is squarefree. As a consequence the RLWE problem is not set up in the
full ring of integers of the number field K = Q[x]/(f). We will nevertheless keep
using these examples for the sake of comparison; it should be clear from the
exposition below that this is not a crucial issue.
As a second instance, the authors of [6] considered polynomials of the form
fn,a,b = x
n + ax+ b with a ≈ b, again chosen such that fn,a,b(1) ≡ 0 modulo q,
which is assumed to be an odd prime. More precisely, they let a = (q− 1)/2 +∆
and b = (q − 1)/2 −∆ − 1, or a = q + ∆ and b = q −∆ − 1, for a small value
of ∆. Heuristically these polynomials also result in weak instances of non-dual
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decision RLWE, even though the analysis cannot be made as precise as in the
foregoing case. In particular, no explicit formula is known for the spectral norm
s1(Nf ), but in [6] a heuristic perturbation argument is given that implies that
it is bounded by
√
max(a, b) · det(Nf )1/n infinitely often. They ran their attack
for the particular case where q = 524287, ∆ = 1, a = q +∆ and b = q −∆− 1:
fn,a,b q r r˜ samplesper run successfulruns
time
per run
x128 + 524288x+ 524285 524287 8.00 45540 20 8 of 10 24 sec
4 A simple attack on search RLWE
We derive a very simple attack on search RLWE for the families and parameter
sets considered by Elias, Lauter, Ozman and Stange in [6]. The attack is based
on two observations.
Firstly, a unit ball in the H-space gets severely deformed when being pulled
back to K ⊗ R along the canonical embedding. With respect to the polynomial
basis 1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1 we end up with an ellipsoid whose axes have lengths
s1(Nf ), . . . , sn(Nf ). For the first family of polynomials (i.e. where a = 0) this is
a geometrically decreasing sequence, while for the second family this statement
remains almost true. In particular a spherical Gaussian distribution Γr with
r = (r, . . . , r) on the H-space will result in a very skew elliptical Gaussian
distribution on K⊗R with parameters s1(Nf ) · r, . . . , sn(Nf ) · r. For the choices
of r (or in fact r˜) made by Elias et al., the errors along the shortest axes of the
ellipsoid are so small that after rounding they become zero.
The second observation is that the axes of the error distribution ellipsoid
coincide almost perfectly with the polynomial basis. Again for the first family
this is exactly the case, while for the second family the distribution is consistent
enough, in the sense that the axes do not line up perfectly, but the coordinates
of the error samples with respect to 1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1 still tend to go down geo-
metrically. The result is that the directions that get squashed simply correspond
to the coefficients of the higher powers of x in the error terms e(x).
To make these statements precise we will compute the singular value decom-
position of the whole transformation matrix Nf · B. Recall that the singular
value decomposition of an n× n matrix M is given by
M = UΣV
t
,
where U, V are n×n unitary matrices and Σ is an n×n matrix with non-negative
real numbers on the diagonal, namely the singular values. The image of a unit
sphere under M will therefore result in an ellipsoid where the axes are given by
the columns of U , with lengths equal to the corresponding singular values.
4.1 Singular value decomposition and error distribution
For the first family of polynomials fn,q everything can be made totally explicit:
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Proposition 2. The singular value decomposition of Nf ·B is
In×n ·Σ · V t, where V = Bt ·Mf ·Σ
and Σ is the diagonal matrix containing the singular values of Nf .
Proof: Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that the Vandermonde matrix
Mf has mutually orthogonal columns, where the ith column has norm
√
nai−1.
Thus the normalized matrix
Mf ·Σ where Σ = diag
(
1/(
√
nai−1)
)
i
= diag (si(Nf ))i
is unitary. But then so is V = B
t ·Mf ·Σ, and since Σ = Σ2 ·Σ−1 = NfNf t ·Σ−1,
we see that
Nf ·B = In×n ·Σ · V t
is the singular value decomposition of our transformation matrix Nf ·B. 
The factor In×n implies that the axes of our ellipsoid match perfectly with the
polynomial basis 1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1. In other words, if we start from a spherical
error distribution Γr on H, r = (r, r, . . . , r), then the induced error distribu-
tion Ψr on K ⊗ R in the ith coordinate (coefficient of xi−1) is a Gaussian with
parameter
si(Nf ) · r = r√
n · (q − 1)(i−1)/n
by Proposition 1. This indeed decreases geometrically with i.
As a side remark, note that this implies that for e(x) ← Ψr the evaluation
e(1) is sampled from a Gaussian with parameter(
n∑
i=1
si(Nf )
2
)1/2
· r = s1(Nf )
√
(q − 1)2 − 1
(q − 1)2 − (q − 1)2(n−1)/n · r.
This is considerably smaller than
√
n · s1(Nf ) · r and explains why the attack
from [6] works better than what their theory predicts [6, §9].
To illustrate the geometric behavior of the coordinates of the errors e(x)
with respect to the polynomial basis, we have plotted the average and standard
deviation of their high order coefficients for the second example x256 + 8190
from [6] in Figure 1 (the results for the first example are totally similar), using
the error parameter that they used to attack non-dual decision RLWE. The plot
shows that for the given parameter set, the highest dn/7e error coefficients in
the polynomial basis of K ⊗ R are all extremely likely to be smaller than 1/2
(indicated by the dashed line) in absolute value and therefore become zero after
rounding.
For the second family of polynomials fn,a,b with a 6= 0, we were not able to
derive the singular value decomposition in such an explicit form. To get a handle
on them, we have computed it explicitly for f = x128 + 524288x + 524285. For
13
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Fig. 1. Distribution of the error terms in the polynomial basis for f = x256 + 8190
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Fig. 2. Zeroes in C of x128 + 524288x+ 524285, along with the unit circle (dashed)
this particular example, the roots of fn,a,b again lie roughly on a circle (except
for the real root close to −1): see Figure 2. So through the Vandermonde matrix
we again expect geometric growth of the singular values, as is confirmed by the
explicit numerics in Figure 3, which shows a plot of their logarithms. There is
only one outlier, caused by the real root of f close to −1.
The heat map in Figure 4 plots the norms of the entries in the U -matrix of
the singular value decomposition of Nf · B and shows that U is close to being
diagonal, implying that the axes of the ellipsoid are indeed lining up almost
perfectly with the polynomial basis. Finally Figure 5 contains a similar plot as
Figure 1, namely, the distribution of the errors terms (highest powers only) for
the polynomial f = x128 + 524288x+ 524285. Again we conclude that with very
high probability, the last dn/6e coefficients of the error terms in the polynomial
basis will be smaller than 1/2, and therefore they become zero after rounding.
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Fig. 4. Heat maps of the norms of the entries of U (left) and log10 of the norms of the
entries of UΣ (right), where UΣV
t
is the singular value decomposition of NfB
4.2 Linear algebra attack on non-dual search RLWE
Turning the above observations into an attack on non-dual search RLWE for
these families is straightforward. Recall that the samples are of the form (a,b =
a ·s+e mod q) where the errors were sampled from the distribution Ψr on K⊗R.
Since a is known, we can express multiplication by a as a linear operation, i.e.
we can compute the n × n matrix Ma that corresponds to multiplication by a
with respect to the polynomial basis 1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1. Each RLWE sample can
therefore be written as a linear algebra problem as follows:
Ma · (s0, s1, . . . , sn−1)t = (b0, b1, . . . , bn−1)t − (e0, e1, . . . , en−1)t (1)
where the si (resp. bi, ei) are the coefficients of s (resp. b and e) with respect
to the polynomial basis. By rounding the coefficients of the right-hand side, we
effectively remove the error terms of high index, which implies that the last equa-
tions in the linear system become exact equations in the unknown coefficients of
15
70 80 90 100 110 120 130
0
2
4
Coefficient index
Mean
Deviation
3x Deviation
Fig. 5. Distribution of errors of high index for f = x128 + 524288x+ 524285
s. Assuming that the highest dn/ke error terms round to zero, we only require k
samples to recover the secret s using simple linear algebra with a 100% success
rate.
We have implemented this attack in Magma [2] with the following results.
fn,a,b q r r˜ samplesper run successfulruns
time
per run
x192 + 4092 4093 8.87 5440 7 10 of 10 8.37 sec
x256 + 8190 8191 8.35 8390 6 10 of 10 17.2 sec
x128 + 524288x+ 524285 524287 8.00 45540 4 10 of 10 1.96 sec
We note that using less samples per run is also possible, but results in a lower
than 100% success rate. A more elaborate strategy would construct several linear
systems of equations by discarding some of the equations of lower index (which
are most likely to be off by 1) and running exhaustively through the kernel of the
resulting underdetermined system of equations. However, we did not implement
this strategy since it needlessly complicates the attack.
In fact for errors of the above size one can also use the linearization technique
developed by Arora and Ge [1, Theorem 3.1] to retrieve s(x), but this requires
a lot more samples.
We stress that our attack does not use that f(1) ≡ 0 mod q. For the above
defining polynomials our attack works modulo every modulus q′, as long as the
same error parameters are used (or smaller ones).
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4.3 Modifications for dual search RLWE
In this section we discuss how switching from non-dual RLWE (i.e. from I = R)
to dual RLWE (where one takes I = R∨) affects our observations. Recall that in
the case of a monogenic defining polynomial f , the codifferent R∨ is generated
as a fractional ideal by 1/f ′(α) with α ∈ C a root of f . We will again work with
respect to the polynomial basis 1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1 of K = Q[x]/(f) over Q, which
is also a basis of R over Z, and take α = x. For technical reasons we will only
do the analysis for the first family of polynomials, namely those of the form
fn,q = fn,0,q−1 = xn + q − 1,
where one has f ′n,q = nx
n−1. Since
1 =
1
q − 1fn,q −
x
n(q − 1)f
′
n,q
we find that
R∨ = R
x
n(q − 1) .
Proposition 3. The elements
1
n
,
x
n(q − 1) ,
x2
n(q − 1) ,
x3
n(q − 1) , . . . ,
xn−1
n(q − 1) (2)
form a Z-basis of R∨.
Proof. It is immediate that
x
n(q − 1) ,
x2
n(q − 1) ,
x3
n(q − 1) , . . . ,
xn−1
n(q − 1) ,
xn
n(q − 1)
form a Z-basis. But modulo fn,q the last element is just −1/n.
Thus we can think of our secret s(x) ∈ R∨q as a Z-linear combination of the
elements in (2), where the coefficients are considered modulo q. A corresponding
RLWE-sample is then of the form (a(x),a(x) ·s(x)+e(x) mod qR∨) with e(x) ∈
R∨⊗R = K⊗R sampled from Ψr for an appropriate choice of r ∈ (R+)n. To make
a comparison with our attack in the non-dual case, involving the parameters
from [6], we have to make an honest choice of r, which we again take spherical.
Note that the lattice σ(R∨) is much denser than σ(R): the covolume gets scaled
down by a factor ∣∣No(f ′n,q(α))∣∣ = nn(q − 1)n−1.
Therefore, in view of the discussion concluding Section 3.2, we scale down our
scaled-up error parameter r˜ by a factor
n
√
nn(q − 1)n−1 ≈ n(q − 1).
Let us denote the result by r˜∨.
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It follows that the dual setting is essentially just a scaled version of its non-
dual counterpart: both the errors and the basis elements become divided by a
factor of roughly n(q − 1). In particular, for the same choices of r we again find
that with near certainty the highest dn/7e error coefficients are all smaller than
1
2
· 1
n(q − 1)
in absolute value, and therefore become zero after rounding to the nearest mul-
tiple of 1/(n(q−1)). This then again results in exact equations in the coefficients
of the secret s(x) ∈ R∨q with respect to the basis (2), that can be solved using
linear algebra.
Here too, the attack does not use that f(1) ≡ 0 mod q so it works for whatever
choice of modulus q′ instead of q, as long as the same error parameters are used
(or smaller ones).
5 Range of applicability
One obvious way of countering our attack is by modifying the error parameter. In
principle the skewness of Nf ·B could be addressed by using an equally distorted
elliptical Gaussian rather than a near-spherical one, but that conflicts with the
philosophy of RLWE (as opposed to PLWE), namely that the more natural way
of viewing a number field is through its canonical embedding. So we will not
discuss this option and stick to spherical distributions. Then the only remaining
way out is to enlarge the width of the distribution. Again for technical reasons
we will restrict our discussion to the first family of polynomials, namely those
of the form fn,q = x
n + q − 1; the conclusions for the second family should be
similar.
In the non-dual case we see that a version of the attack works as long as a
sample drawn from a univariate Gaussian with parameter sn(Nf ) · r˜ has absolute
value less than 1/2 with non-negligible probability: then by rounding one obtains
at least one exact equation in the unknown secret s(x). For this one needs that
sn(Nf ) · r˜ ≤ C
2
for some absolute constant C > 0 that quantifies what it means to be ‘non-
negligible’.
Remark 1. In order to recover the entire secret, one even wants a non-negligible
probability for n consecutive samples to be less than 1/2, for which one should
replace sn(Nf )·r˜ by sn(Nf )·r˜·
√
log n (roughly). In fact a slightly better approach
is to find the optimal 1 ≤ k ≤ n for which sn−k+1(Nf ) · r˜ is likely to be less than
1/2, thereby yielding at least k exact equations at once, for dn/ke consecutive
times.
18
Let us take C = 1 in what follows: for this choice meeting the upper bound
corresponds to a chance of about 98.78% of recovering at least one exact equa-
tion. Using Proposition 1 this can be rewritten as
r˜ ≤ 1
2
· √n · (q − 1)1−1/n. (3)
For our two specific polynomials x192 + 4092 and x256 + 8190 the right-hand
side reads 27148.39 and 63253.95 whereas Elias et al. took r˜ to be 5440.28 and
8399.70, respectively.
Note that the bound in (3) does not depend on the modulus q′ that is being
used: the q that appears there is just part of the data defining our number field.
In other words, whenever r˜ satisfies (3) then for every choice of modulus q′ we
are very likely to recover at least one exact equation in the coefficients of the
secret s(x).
Unfortunately the bound (3) does not allow for an immediate comparison
with the hardness result of Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev (see Theorem 1),
which was formulated for dual RLWE only. But for dual RLWE one can make
a similar analysis. From Section 4.3 it follows that we want error coefficients
that are smaller than 1/(2n(q − 1)) with a non-negligible probability. The same
discussion then leads to the bound
r˜∨ ≤ 1
2
· 1√
n · (q − 1) 1n (4)
which is highly incompatible with the condition r˜∨ ≥ 2ω(√log n) from Theo-
rem 1. Thus we conclude that it is impossible to enlarge the error parameter up
to a range where our attack would form an actual threat to RLWE, as defined
in [9, §3].
Another issue with modifying the error parameter is decodability. In the non-
dual case, from (3) we see that sn(Nf )· r˜  1 is needed to avoid being vulnerable
to our skewness attack. But it automatically follows that s1(Nf ) · r˜  q. Indeed,
this is implied by the fact that the condition number k(Nf ) := s1(Nf )/sn(Nf )
equals
(q − 1)1−1/n ≈ q
by Proposition 1. This causes the errors at the terms of low degree to wrap
around modulo q. In the dual case the same observation applies, where now the
error terms of low degree tend to wrap around modulo multiples of q·1/(n(q−1)).
In both cases the effect is that several of these terms become indistinguishable
from uniform, requiring more samples for the RLWE problem to become in-
formation theoretically solvable. This obstructs, or at least complicates, certain
cryptographic applications.
So overall, the conclusion is that the defining polynomials fn,a,b are just not
well-suited for use in RLWE: either the error parameter is too small for the
RLWE problem to be hard, or the error parameter is too large for the problem
to be convenient for use in cryptography. But we stress once more that neither
the attack from [6] nor our attack form a genuine threat to RLWE, as it was
defined in [9, §3].
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that non-dual search RLWE can be solved effi-
ciently for the families of polynomials and parameter sets from [6] which were
shown to be weak for the decision version of the problem. The central reason
for this weakness lies in the (exponential) skewness of the canonical embedding
transformation. We analyzed the singular value decomposition of this transfor-
mation and showed that the singular values form an (approximate) geometric
series. Furthermore, we also showed that the axes of the error ellipsoid are con-
sistent with the polynomial basis, allowing us to readily identify very small noise
coefficients. The attack applies to wider ranges of moduli, and also applies to the
dual version, but does not contradict any statement in the work of Lyubashevsky,
Peikert and Regev [9].
It is worth remarking that while we used the language of singular value de-
composition, for our skewness attack it merely suffices that Nf · B has a very
short row, so that the corresponding error coefficient ei vanishes after rounding
and (1) provides an exact equation in the coefficients of the secret. For general
number fields this is a strictly weaker condition than having a very small singular
value whose corresponding axis lines up perfectly with one of the polynomial ba-
sis vectors. But for the particular families of [6] the singular value decomposition
turned out to be a convenient tool in proving this, and in visualizing how the
RLWE errors are transformed under pull-back along the canonical embedding.
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